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Right of Spouse to Elect Against Will
Since 1930 when Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law became effective,
New York case law, in keeping with the recommendations of the Commission to
Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates,1 has developed a fairly firm doctrine
with respect to illusory transfers in trust to the surviving spouse. The statute was
viewed as remedial legislation, to be construed liberally for the benefit of the sur-
viving spouse.2 One series of cases held trusts illusory where they failed to provide
full life income to the surviving spouse because of mortmain dictates of the
decedent, directing the trust to terminate on certain contingencies.3 Other cases
were directed to trusts in which the trustee was given discretion to invade the
corpus on behalf of persons other than the surviving spouse.4 The broad scope
of powers given to a trustee led to the well-known Curleyu decision in which the
court granted a right of election to the widow because of the possible infringement
of her beneficial share from the uncontrolled discretion of the trustee.6 In ro
Schrauth's Will' and In re Clark's Will" involved questions of stock in family
corporations which formed the major part of the trust corpus. In each case, the
widow was allowed her elective share on the grounds that the trusts were not
truly beneficial, but in both cases, it was shown that the corporations were in
fact not producing any income.
If this case history is viewed liberally in the spirit of the Commission which
proposed it, the possibility that the benefical enjoyment would be impaired would
seem to warrant the granting of an elective right. On the other hand, where the
1. LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 69, p. 87: It does not seem to the Commission to be
desirable that the right to take the intestate share should be given to the sur-
viving spouse in every estate, regardless of its amount. But while immediate
necessities should be provided for, there should be some limitation" by way of
permitting the income only upon the balance of the intestate share to be paid
over during the life of the surviving spouse. Therefore, in the larger estates,
the Commission proposes to preserve to the testator a right to create a trust,
with income payable to the wife, upon a principal equal to or greater than her
intestate share.
2. In re Bommer's Estate, 159 Misc. 511, 288 N. Y. Supp. 419 (Surr. Ct.
1936); In re Ainsworth's Estate, 160 Misc. 789, 291 N. Y. Supp. 825 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
3. In re Byrnes' Estate, 141 Misc. 346, 252 N. Y. Supp. 587 (Surr. Ct. 1931),
aff'd., 235 App. Div. 782, 257 N. Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't 1932), af'd., 260 N. Y. 465,
184 N. E. 56 (1933); In re Bommer's Estate, 159 Misc. 511, 288 N. Y. Supp. 419
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
4. In re Matthew's Will, 255 App. Div. 80, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 707 (2d Dep't 1938);
In re Sheppard's Estate, 189 Misc. 367, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 340 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
5. In re Curley's Estate, 151 Misc. 664, 272 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Surr. Ct. 1934),
modified, 245 App. Div. 255, 280 N. Y. Supp. 80 (2d Dep't 1935), afJ'd. mem., 269
N. Y. 548, 199 N. E. 665 (1935).
6. As a result of the Curley decision, the legislature enacted N. Y. DECEDENT
ESTATE LAW §18(1)(h), giving the Surrogate Courts administrative control over
trustees.
7. 249 App. Div. 846, 292 N. Y. Supp. 923 (2d Dep't 1937).
8. 1 A. D. 2d 567, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 911 (4th Dep't 1956).
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impairment results only from the nature of the property without any design or
intent to curtail the beneficial interest, there would not seem to be the same
compelling reasons for such an election.
In re Shupack's IWil 9 illustrates this situation and exemplifies two divergent
interpretations of the scope of the elective right. The testator's property consisted
primarily of six wholly-owned corporations which he placed in three separate
and equal trusts, one for his widow and one each for his two children. The widow
asserted a right of election against the testamentary provision made for her on
the basis that the childrens' interests were necessarily antagonistic to her own
and that their two-thirds control of the corporations could possibly result in a
failure of income from her trust. This contention highlights the essential consid-
eration as to the legislative intent; i.e., was it to insure for the widow the sub-
stantial equivalent of her intestate share of the assets her husband held at death
or was it to insure further that the trust would be substantially beneficial?
In denying the right of election, the Court indicated that the statute could
not have been designed to guarantee any particular income. Rather, any possibility
of income impairment resulted from the character of her husband's assets - a
character which was unfortunate for the widow but one which did not form the
basis for an expansion of Section 18's coverage. In contrast, the minority argued
that it was this very possibility of impairment which the elective right was
designed to remedy. Without a reasonable certainty of substantial benefit, the
trust was illusory in fact and failed to meet the statutory test.
The principal case outlines one of the few real areas of contention which
remains on the borderline. Depending on the breadth of the interpretation given
it, Section 18 could embrace either the majority or the minority position. The
widow may receive an entirely fair and ratable cross-section of her husband's assets
in a trust which meets the literal statutory test but which suffers under the threat
of impairment of income, resulting from the very nature of the assets. Only
judicial balancing of current socio-economic factors can supply the key.
Precafory Language
Constructions of wills frequently have been required in New York because
of the use of precatory or hortatory language, words which-purport to express a
desire or wish rather than a mandatory direction for the distribution of the estate.
The applicable test to be applied is whether the testator meant simply to advise or
influence a discretion vested in someone or to control and direct a certain dispo-
9. 1 N. Y. 2d 482, 136 N. E. 2d 513 (1956), modifing 1 A. D. 2d 841, 149
N. Y. S. 2d 20 (2d Dep't 1956).
